Kasie Juntrad

Kasie Juntrad
I was a cadet

Kamis, 18 Juli 2019

POLITICS & ENFORCEMENT OF LAW AJUDICATION IN INDONESIA


Sonny Wibisono*[1]
I.                   FOREWORD
Since its birth, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) playing role as a independent institution that acts as a trigger mechanism for other law enforcement institutions in Indonesia that can empower the public skepticism about weak law enforcement. Corruption Eradication Commission has legal facilities and infrastructure with extraordinary levels of authority (extra ordinary power) that are different from other law enforcement institutions in Indonesia. The extra ordinary fundamental authority of Corruption Eradication Commission has became as the front-gate of the existence of itself, starting from the investigation stage to find sufficient initial evidence determined by at least two evidences, including and not limited to information or data that is spoken, sent and received or digital evidences, the Corruption Eradication Commission also can request information from the bank about the financial condition of the suspect (without permission from Indonesian Central Bank), tapping / recording conversations, do not need permission to examine state officials and others. However, the Corruption Eradication Commission also has authority limits in carrying out law enforcement, including those listed in Article 11 of constitutions  No. 30 of 2002 about Corruption Eradication Commission which states:
In carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 6 letter c, the Corruption Eradication Commission has the authority to carry out investigations and prosecution of corruption that:
a. Involving law enforcement officials, state administrators, and others related to criminal acts of corruption committed by law enforcement officials or state administrators;
b. Achieving the public attention regarding of such corruptions issue ; and / or
c. Regarding state losses of at least Rp. 1,000,000,000.00 (one billion rupiah).[2]
Furthermore, regarding the definition of state administrators are listed in constitution No. 28 of 1999 about the Implementation of Clean and Free of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism in Article 2 point 2 it is stated that state administrators include State Officials at the State High Institutions. Corruption involving state officials such as politicians to judges and law enforcement officials confirms that corruption in Indonesia is a concerning reality because it threatens the establishment of a country, corruption as a chronic cancer is not only impedes the countries economic recovery, but also a joint destroyer of law enforcement in this country.
The democratic system and law enforcement need to pay attention to the orientation of the balanced of interest among the three pillars, which is the Society, State and Law Enforcer whose existence of the pillar has the function of checks and balances to obtain the final result in the form of fair and true law enforcement.
The purpose of law enforcement by The Corruption Eradication Commission is not to cause dis-integration among law enforcement agencies, but how to maximize non-discriminatory law enforcement as already mention above by the aouthor. In addition, the independence of the law enforcement process is an imperative discourse. It must be acknowledged that it will be difficult for the Indonesian National Police and the Indonesian Prosecutor's to maximize the eradication of corruption, as long as independence in the context of limits is still in the subordinate status of the highest executive power, which will give the impression of permissive authoritarian power. Disturbances, attacks and interventions against law enforcement institutions are very strong. The pattern of intervention was packaged in the form of quasi-independence, such as the placement of law enforcement agencies that became power sub-ordinations, all of which gave direction, as if there was justification behind the principle of legality of subordination.
Furthermore, the affirmation of the pattern of intervention has actually been reminded and seen at the Seventh United Nations Congress on "Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders" in Milan in 1985, it has discussed a theme which is not classic, namely "The New Dimension of Crime in the Context of Development" . In one of the results of the discussion about this "new dimension" that was highlighted was about the occurrence and increasing "abuse of power". This abuse of power involves "upper economic class" ("established society") and "upper power class" parties (high state organizers) who make conspiracies and aim for economic interests, even political interests of certain groups, so that the pretext of supporting corruption eradication is merely an institutional symbolic movements, with the ultimate goal of finally weakening the law enforcement.
In this paper the author will discuss the case that was once handled by the Corruption Eradication Commission where the suspect was an official of a high state institution and a High Judge named M. Akil Muhtar. Corruption carried out by M. Akil Muhtar and his colleagues included the category of political corruption, which is a form of abuse of power by manipulating policies, institutions, and rules or procedures, related to the allocation of resources and financing, carried out by policy makers to continue to maintain power, status and his wealth.

II.                MAIN DISCUSSION
A. Brief Case Analysis
M. Akil Muhtar as the Head of the Constitutional Court, during the period of 2010 to 2013 received a sum of more than Rp. 57 billion which was allegedly obtained in connection with bribery in resolving disputes in regional elections in the Constitutional Court. Most of the receipts of bribes use a company account called “CV Ratu Samagat” which was established in 2010. The owner and management of the company is noted to be the son and wife of Akil Muchtar. The establishment of the company should be suspected as an attempt to deceive the detection of suspicious financial transactions by the bank or financial law authority, considering that by using the name of the company an account was made and the account was used to receive deposits from third parties with inclusion of businesses such as buying and selling palm oil, heavy equipment and so on. For the transaction, the Investigators successfully proved most of the transactions was not an actual transaction but a transaction related to the dispute resolution of election case handled by M. Akil Muhtar.
B. Case Management
Started with an anonymous public complaint related to alleged bribery involving a judge who served in a high state institution where the judge received a bribe of money related to the dispute over Regional Head Election, then the complaint was received by the Corruption Eradication Commission through the KWS (KPK Whistleblower System) mechanism, with this facility, an informant can report a suspected criminal act of corruption and the confidentiality of the informants is guaranteed from the possibility of disclosure of his or her identity to the public. In addition, through this facility an informant can also actively play a role and monitor the progress of reports submitted by opening a secret communication box without the need to worry about his identity being known to others.
After being received and carried out a review of the complaint, the Corruption Eradication Commission immediately formed an investigation team and carried out interception of telephone conversations and conducted surveillance measures against a Judge and Chairperson of the Constitutional Court who later became known as Akil Mochtar and those who related and affiliated with him. Then on the night of October 2, 2013 the Corruption Eradication Commission conducted an red handed operation against Akil Mochtar at his residence and secured banknotes in the form of US dollars, Singapore dollars and Rupiahs which were estimated to be worth billions of rupiahs.
The Corruption Eradication Commission gave multiple accusations to Akil Mochtar, namely being charged with the Corruption Eradication Act and the Money Laundering Crime Act. Akil Mochtar was thrown into prison with demands for life imprisonment, a fine of Rp10 billion, and revocation of the right to be elected and elected. And on February 23, 2015, the Judge at the Supreme Court also sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of Rp10 billion.
C. Challenges of the Corruption Eradication Commission
The Corruption Eradication Commission in its efforts to eradicate corruption in Indonesia always put forward a case of red handed operations where in 2018 the Corruption Eradication Commission succeeded in registering 168 bribery cases which were revealed beginning with the interception / tapping stage in the investigation until the case was rolling and processed into prosecutions and judges decisions at the trial. Ironically, in bribery cases it always involves state officials / organizers so that various efforts continue to be made by those who have an interest in amputating Corruption Eradication Commission’s authority, by carrying out political pressure, with varied patterns and methods. Through the system pattern, this has a comprehensive meaning, especially if this system approach is associated with the role of state institutions, such as the People Council’s of Indonesian Republic, which is very decisive as one of the state institutions in the final regulatory process to eradicate corruption.

               III.            CONCLUSION
First, a fair criticism from the community acts as a pillar of monitoring to control the Corruption Eradication Commission’s institutional performance. the Corruption Eradication Commission was sharply highlighted by the House of Representatives of Indonesian Republic regarding the acts of forced effort, such as wiretapping, on the other hand the Corruption Eradication Commission received appreciation, when the Corruption Eradication Commission controversy related to red handed operations against members of the Executive, Judiciary, Legislative and State Institutions, therefore the Corruption Eradication Commission’s process and front-gate investigations including wiretapping are essential.
Second, the Corruption Eradication Commission Law Revision at the initiative of the House of Representatives of Indonesian Republic will influence the existence of the Corruption Eradication Commission as a law enforcer, the concerning output is not a reinforcement but an amputation of institutional authority. Special authority is indeed the institutional basis of the Corruption Eradication Commission, which is stated on Article 44 of the Corruption Eradication Commission Law, which places the Corruption Eradication Commission in the investigation stage is authorized to obtain sufficient preliminary evidence with a minimum of 2 evidence, and this investigation process as the Corruption Eradication Commission with wiretapping authority can develop 2 evidences that was followed up with Silent Red Handed Operations or commonly known as OTT. Tapping carried out by the Corruption Eradication Commission is based on a “Legal by Special Regulated”, which means it is still has an obligation to evaluate the actions, and certainly different from tapping based on “Legal by Court Orders” with the obligation to require a Court Permit to do so. The act of intercepting calls and wiretapping by Corruption Eradication Commission It is justified because of the special institutions and special authorities as an extension and justification of the “clear and present danger” principle of corruption are very concerning and become the authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission. Tapping process with the permission of the Court is not necessary for the Corruption Eradication Commission because the tapping process carried out by the Corruption Eradication Commission is based on Legal by Special Regulated, not Legal by Court Order which is different from its justification regime.
Third, the House differentiation attitude which would weaken the special authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission as institutions is very decisive in terms of the Tapping issue which must be court-approved (Article 14 RUU), even though it is known that as a special institution with special authority, the Corruption Eradication Commission’s wiretapping authority is based on Legal by Special Regulated based on audits and evaluations of wiretapping, rather than Court Permits. Issuance of SP3 (Article 42), even though the Corruption Eradication Commission has the authority to terminate the Investigation considering the Corruption Eradication Commission’s authority to find preliminary evidence is sufficient at the stage of pre-investigation, not post-investigation. Confiscation with sufficient preliminary evidence at the stage of pre-investigation (Article 49), even though sufficient preliminary evidence that is the authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission is precisely at the stage of the pre-investigation. The obligation of the Corruption Eradication Commission to report to the Indonesian National Police and the General Prosecutors Office, if the Corruption Eradication Commission handles the pre-investigation first (Article 52 paragraph 2), the Corruption Eradication Commission is tasked as a Coordination and Supervision of other law enforcement agencies. The prosecution was handed over to the Prosecutor at the Prosecutor's Office (Article 53 paragraph 1) while the Corruption Eradication Commission in the enforcement process was an integrated institution with the One-Roof System contained in the process of pre-investigation, post-investigation and Prosecution. The assumed duration of the Corruption Eradication Commission  is only 12 years (Article 73), even though assembly of the people's deliberations of Indonesian Republic Decree No. VIII In 2001, the mandate for the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission was not given the duration of the validity period. These articles indeed lead to the attitude of reducing and amputating the authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission.
Fourth, a revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission Law requires discussion with patterns of synchronization and harmonization with the related Draft Laws, such as Draft Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Corruption, Asset Deprivation, Money Laundering, etc. A partial revision of Corruption Eradication Commission law are certainly seems to be a negative goal towards the impact of the Corruption Eradication Commission.
Fifth, thus, without any synchronization and harmonization between the Draft on Corruption Eradication Commission Law with the other Draft Laws (Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Corruption, Money Laundering, Asset Deprivation and others) whose discussion was not carried out simultaneously and parallel, it was concerned indeed the main objective is to weaken the Corruption Eradication Commission’s. The experience of the Corruption Eradication Commission Law Revision in June 2015 as well as the provisions on the procedure for wiretapping with the Court's permission which then proved the resistance of the public to the will of reinforcement which impacted weakening authority of Corruption Eradication Commission itself.
The will to implement the Due Process of Law model often experiences obstacles, because the potential barrier to eradicating corruption is the tight intervention of power and political interest in the law enforcement process, so that efforts to minimize corruption will become stagnant. Behavior of power must mean adigium: Politics are adopted by the Laws, not Laws to the Politics.


[1] Investigator at Corruption Eradication Commission. Indonesia.
[2] Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning Corruption Eradication Commission